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I. Introduction:An Issue of Implied Easements
Those who regularly practice law in Indian Country have no doubt
encountered the myriad of issues surrounding rights-of-way over Indian lands.
They can be pernicious. Among them are claims by non-Indian fee land
owners that they have an implied easement over adjacent trust lands. Far from
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General for the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation. I would like to thank
the editors of the American Indian Law Review as well as their anonymous reviewers for their
helpful suggestions on improving this article.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009

AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 33

being arcane, this issue is one faced by tribes on a regular basis.' This article
shows why there are no implied easements over trust lands.
Private land owners often seek ways across tribal lands to access fee
parcels. At times these owners have asserted a legal right to do so. Those
assertions are typically grounded in the non-Indian common law doctrine of
implied easements from necessity. Neither the United States Supreme Court
nor any federal appellate court has ever directly addressed whether an
easement can be implied from necessity against the government. Several
federal district courts have weighed in on the issue, and the results are often
contrary to tribal interests and, generally speaking, ill-reasoned. But the
fundamental legal issue at play in these matters, whether an easement can be
implied against a sovereign, is not limited to tribes. Many states faced this
question in the early years of land patents. The better reasoned state court
decisions held that an easement from necessity cannot be implied against a
state. Likewise, this article argues that application of an implied easement
theory against the lands of a sovereign, particularly lands held in trust by the
United States for Indians and tribes, is inapposite.
However, implied easements are not limited to those arising from necessity.
A land owner might reasonably argue that Congress intended for an implied
easement to run against government lands in certain circumstances when it
passed a given piece of enabling legislation. As this article will show, this is
the real issue of concern in right-of-way disputes over Indian lands. However,
when it comes to trust property there is little likelihood Congress intended
Indian proprietary rights to be divested by mere implication under the various
allotment acts. This is bolstered by federal court decisions holding that
Congress did not intend to create implied easements under the Homestead
Act.2
An experienced Indian law practitioner may wonder at this point why
implied easements are even an issue in Indian Country. After all, there are
specific federal statutes that authorize the granting of easements by the
Department of the Interior and implied easements, of any kind, are not among
them. Furthermore, the Quiet Title Act specifically does not waive the
sovereign immunity of the federal government from suits seeking to quiet title

1. In re Schugg, 384 B.R. 263 (D. Ariz. 2008); Brendale v. Olney, No. C-78-145 (E.D.
Wash. filed Mar. 3, 1981) (Memorandum Decision and Judgment). The author is also presently
involved in litigation concerning whether the BIA can find a right-of-way over trust lands based
on an implied easement theory.
2. Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2006); United States
v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348 (10th Cir. 1997).
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over Indian lands.' Consequently, for this to be a concern to tribes,
implausibly, the Department of the Interior, which has a trust responsibility
toward tribes, would have to find that a non-Indian fee owner has an implied
easement over trust lands in an administrative proceeding. As explained in
section two, regrettably, this unlikely set of circumstances may not be so farfetched. Current documents emanating from Interior's Pacific Northwest
Regional Solicitor's Office indicate there are at least some people at Interior
who believe such easements are possible or desirable. Unfortunately, for this
reason, implied easements are of real concern to tribes.
Road access across tribal lands is fundamentally grounded in the doctrine
of implied easements. As the court in Miller's Lessee states, "It is a well
settled principle that the statute of limitations does not run against a state. If
a contrary rule were recognized, it would only be necessary for intruders on
the public lands to maintain their possessions until the statute of limitations
shall run, and they then would become invested with the title against the
government, and all persons claiming under it." 4 This rule applies equally to
prescriptive easements insofar as, pursuant to American common law, they are
the servitude equivalent of adverse possession.5 Thus, absent an explicit grant,
the only way an easement can run against the United States, and consequently
those lands held in trust by the government for Indians, is by implication.
For purposes of easements across Indian trust lands, implication could
arguably come in two forms. First is an implied easement from necessity, also
known as a way of necessity. Pursuant to American common law, implied
easements from necessity have three necessary and sufficient elements: "(1)
a conveyance, (2) of a physical part only of the grantor's land, and (3) after
severance of the two parcels, it is 'necessary' to pass over one of them to reach
a public right-of-way from the other."6 When these elements exist, the
common law presumes the grantor actually intended for the grantee, or visa
versa as the case may be, to have a way to access their property at the time the
land was conveyed.' However, when the United States is seeking an implied
easement across lands the rule does not apply.' The reason is obvious:
eminent domain. The government always has a way to access its own lands,

3. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2006).
4. Lindsey v. Miller's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 666, 672 (1832).
5. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, WILI.AM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.7 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter THE LAW OF PROPERTY].
6. Id. § 8.5.
7. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 679 (1979).
8. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. 668.
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albeit with a forced payment.9 The second manner in which an easement
might impliedly run through government land is via congressional intent.'0
Here the idea is that an easement may be implied if it can be shown that
Congress intended for lands to include an easement when disposed of under
an authorizing statute."
For reasons detailed in section three of this article, the common law "way
of necessity doctrine" does not apply when common ownership, also known
as unity of title, is found in the federal government. 2 Consequently, ways of
necessity cannot be implied across Indian trust lands. Section three analyzes
state and federal cases that either directly address the issue of ways of
necessity where unity of title is found in the federal government or tangentially
touch on this issue. The issue remains an open question in the federal
appellate courts." However, the most compelling and comprehensive state
and lower federal court decisions are those that militate against finding an
implied way of necessity over the lands of a sovereign. 4 Section three also
addresses the opinion of those legal commentators who maintain that ways of
necessity can, or should, run against the government for two primary reasons:
(1) because it is consistent with purported public policy favoring full
utilization of land and (2) it is supposedly in "harmony" with the inference that
parties intend to grant easements in these circumstances.' 5 Whether there is or
ought to be a public policy favoring full utilization of lands in this day and age
of environmental decline and whether such a policy ought to justify finding
ways of necessity against the government in these circumstances rests with the
policy making body-namely Congress and state legislatures-not the courts.
This is especially true when those policy making bodies have created a
statutory process for establishing easements across sovereign lands and have
notably failed to provide for ways of necessity. Furthermore, application of

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at681.
12. While the Third Restatement of the Law of Property: Servitudes states that "[s]ervitudes
by necessity arise on conveyances by governmental bodies as well as by other grantors," it does
not give any analysis to support its conclusory statement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 2.15 (1998).
13. See Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2006).
14. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979); United States v. Rindge, 208 F.
611 (S.D. Cal. 1913); Sun Studs, Inc., 83 Interior Dec. 518 (1976); Pearne v. Coal Creek Mining
& Mfg Co., 18 S.W. 402, 404 (Tenn. 1891).
15. JAMES W. ELY, JR. & JON W. BRUCE, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND
§ 4.7 (2007).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol33/iss2/3

No. 2]

NO IMPLIED EASEMENTS OVER TRUST LANDS

a public policy favoring full utilization of land to implicitly divest Indians of
proprietary rights in trust lands is a ghastly cry back to the ethnocidal policies
of the United States of the mid to late 1800s. Finally, as for inferred intent,
while applying the theory to government lands may be "harmonious" with
common law principles concerning private land, it is actually cacophonous to
long-standing common law doctrines involving government lands.
Nor is there any congressional intent that implied easements run against
Indian trust lands, as argued in section four. This is particularly so given the
language of the General Allotment Act, 6 the obvious intent of Congress to
prevent unauthorized alienation of Indian lands in various other pieces of
legislation, 7 federal common law rules of interpretation involving federal
proprietary interests generally 8 and Indian Country specifically,' 9 similarities
in purpose between the General Allotment Act and the Homestead Act, and
Congress's extensive statutory regulation of rights-of-way over Indian trust
lands that do not provide for a way of necessity process but rather a consent
by majority owner process.2"
II. Setting the Stage: Specific Statutes, the Quiet Title Act, and the
Department ofthe Interior
There are a number of specific federal statutes that directly govern rights-ofway over Indian lands. Those statutes place certain conditions on the
Secretary of the Interior's exercise of power in granting easements, some of
which specifically require the consent of a majority of the Indian beneficiary
owners. 21 In addition, the Quiet Title Act precludes suit against the
government on the part of a fee owner who is denied such a request through

16. Ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (2006)).
17. Nonintercourse Act, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177
(2006)); 25 U.S.C. § 461-479 (2006) (present codification of Indian Reorganization Act of

1932);

FELIX S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 508

(Rennard Strickland et al.

eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
18. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); Burke v. Gulf, Mobile
& Ohio R.R. Co., 465 F. 2d 1206, 1209 (5th Cir. 1972); Walton v. United States, 415 F.2d 121,
123 (10th Cir. 1969).
19. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941); United States v.
Shoshone, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston R.R. v. United States,
92 U.S. 733, (1875).
20. 25 U.S.C. §§ 311-328 (2006).
21. Id. § 324.
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administrative procedures.22 Consequently, it would appear that these factors
join to render the question of implied easements over Indian lands a non-issue.
After all, if specific statutes require majority consent and a denial of a request
by a fee owner on the part of the federal government is not subject to review
because sovereign immunity has not been waived, then there is no avenue for
a fee owner to succeed with such a claim. Unfortunately, for the reasons set
out in this section, this is not the case. One reason is that the Department of
the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs in particular, may be persuaded
by such implied easement arguments-or at least find them an appealing
solution to thorny problems-and grant such rights in an administrative
proceeding.
The Secretary of the Interior has certain statutorily imposed duties
concerning rights-of-way on Indian lands. In 1899 Congress gave the
Secretary the power to grant rights-of-way for railroad, telegraph, and phone
lines on Indian lands. 3 While not specifically requiring consent of the
beneficiaries, the statute has certain limitations on the grant of a right-of-way.
For example, rights-of-way can only be granted if an applicant made the
request in good faith.24 Furthermore, if beneficiaries object to such a grant,
they are to be afforded a full opportunity to be heard on the matter.25 In 1901
Congress passed a law authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to grant rightsof-way to state or local authorities for the purpose of constructing public
highways on Indian lands. 26 This statute constrains such grants to terms the
Secretary deems appropriate and further requires that, at a minimum, state laws
governing the establishment of public highways be followed. 27 A corollary to
this statute is that a state does not have the power to construct such highways
on Indian lands absent Secretarial consent under the specific federal statute
regardless of the existence of other, more general federal statutes governing
the construction of public highways.2"

22. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2006).
23. Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 312).

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 832, § 4, 31 Stat. 1058, 1084 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 311).

27. Id.
28. Bennett County, S.D. v. United States, 394 F.2d 8 (8th Cir. 1968); see United States v.
10.69 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Yakima County, 425 F. 2d 317, 320 (9th Cir. 1970)
(supporting the premise that as between competing interests of the Secretary of Transportation
and the Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of Transportation must also comply with the specific
statute governing construction of public highways on Indian lands and follow the Department
of the Interior's procedures governing such grants).
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There are several other specific statutes governing certain types of rights-ofway, but the most noteworthy for the purposes of this article is a law passed
by Congress in 1948 that authorized the Secretary of the Interior to grant
rights-of-way over Indian trust lands for any purpose.29 A conspicuous
condition on such grants, however, is that majority beneficial owner consent
must be obtained.30

Arguably, the significant network of specific statutes governing the granting
of specific and general types of rights-of-way over Indian lands is evidence
that grants of rights-of-way over Indian lands must be grounded in a specific
congressional authorizing statute. After all, it is clear that no interest in Indian
lands can be obtained via common law theories governing long-term use,
adverse possession, or prescription.3 Even laws governing condemnation of
lands for purposes of highway construction are inapplicable on Indian lands. 2
The Quiet Title Act would also appear to render the issue of implied
easements over trust lands moot. Pursuant to the Quiet Title Act, the United
States has waived its sovereign immunity from suit so that it may be a named
party as a defendant in a civil action to adjudicate a disputed title to real
property in which the United States claims an interest. 33 However, there is a
noted exception to this general waiver: It does not apply to trust or restricted
Indian lands. 4 Furthermore, the Quiet Title Act is the exclusive means by
which one can challenge the United States' title to real property because
precisely drawn, detailed statutes preempt more general remedies. 5
Consequently, the waiver of immunity found in the Administrative Procedures
Act will not serve to override the government's clear assertion of sovereign
immunity under the Quiet Title Act as it pertains to Indian trust lands. 36 The
Quiet Title Act would therefore appear to be a complete bar to anyone trying
to assert an implied easement over trust lands, assuming the government rules
against them in an administrative proceeding.

29. 25 U.S.C. § 323 (2006).
30. Id.; 25 C.F.R. § 169.3(a),(b) (2006).
31. United States v. S. Pac. Transp. Co. 543 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Colvard, 89 F.2d 312, 314-15 (4th Cir. 1937); Schilling v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 298 F.
Supp. 2d 800 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
32. United States v. Minnesota, 95 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1938).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2006).
34. Id.; Carlson v. Tulalip Tribes of Wash., 510 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1975).
35. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. ofUniv. & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273,286 (1983).
36. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Regulation v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248, 1255 (1Ith
Cir. 1985).
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Unfortunately, the Department of the Interior may not agree that the specific
statutes and the Quiet Title Act bar a claim to an implied easement over trust
lands. First, with regard to the Quiet Title Act, it is certainly a bar to a suit in
federal district court concerning an administrative decision by the Department
of the Interior insofar as such a suit sounds either directly or indirectly in an
action to quiet title to Indian trust lands. However, the Quiet Title Act does
not bar the Department of the Interior from ruling in favor of a party seeking
an implied easement in an administrative proceeding." Second, with regard
to the need to find authority for the granting of an implied easement in a
specific federal statute and that no such grant can be made without complying
with, at least, the 1948 act governing the granting of rights-of-way for any
purpose, the Department of the Interior may find that it does not serve as a bar
to pre-1948 roads.
In fact, the Pacific Northwest Regional Office of the Solicitor has issued a
memorandum unpersuasively concluding that it is possible for an implied
easement to be found over Indian lands provided the road in question predates
the 1948 statute and the easement is implied from necessity under the common
law way of necessity theory.3 Furthermore, despite a National Congress of
the American Indian resolution specifically calling on the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to formally and publicly declare that it must obtain majority beneficial
owner consent before granting or recognizing a right-of-way across trust or
restricted Indian lands, 39 the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs has
indicated that the Bureau's original position (as contained in the Solicitor's
memorandum) has not changed. 0 Consequently, Indian law practitioners need
to be ready to deal with these arguments through the administrative process in
the event the Department of the Interior fails to change its untenable position.41

37. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2006).
38. Memorandum from the Office of the Reg'l Solicitor Concerning Road Right-of-Way
Issues on the Umatilla Indian Reservation (Mar. 2006) (on file with author).
39. Nat'l Cong. of Am. Indians, Consent Required for Right-of-Way, Resolution No.
#DEN-07-009 (Nov. 2007), availableat http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resolutions/doc/DEN-07009.pdf.
40. Letter from Jerry Gidner, Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to M. Brent
Leonhard, Deputy Attorney General for the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with author).
41. Arguably, if the Department of Interior sustains such a position in a given case it is
liable for damages for breach of its trust responsibility.
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III. Ways of Necessity andthe Problem with Unity of Title
The idea of an implied easement running against the government due to
necessity is not new but remains unsettled as far as federal appellate courts are
concerned.42 For the reasons below, this article concludes that easements
implied from necessity do not run against government lands. This is
particularly the case with regard to lands held in trust by the federal
government for tribes and their members. Before delving in to the details,
however, it may be helpful to review just what "unity of title" is and how it
pertains to ways of necessity.
A. What Is Unity of Title and What Does It Have to Do With Ways of
Necessity?
Easements are servitudes in land. As such they do not give the holder a
right to possession of land but only to use.43 They are essentially burdens or
encumbrances on the lands of others. Unlike licenses, which are terminable
at will, easements exist for a determinate time or perpetually." At common
law, if certain conditions exist, an easement can be implied. There are
generally three categories of implied easements: prior use, necessity, and
plat.4 5 Easements derived from prior use clearly do not apply to Indian lands.'
Easements implied from plats or subdivisions are not relevant to this article.
However, the application of the doctrine of easements implied from necessity
remains an open question on Indian lands.
An easement implied from necessity is typically referred to as a "way of
necessity".4 7 Ways of necessity have three elements: (1) a conveyance, (2) of
a physical part only of the grantor's land (consequently, they retain part of the
original lot being divided); and (3) after severance of the two parcels it is
necessary to pass over one to get to the other.48 The second element in
particular establishes the requirement that there be "unity of title".
To make out a case for a way of necessity over another person's land, the
person seeking the easement must establish there was unity of ownership in the

42. See Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 2006).
43. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supranote 5, § 8.1.

44. Id. at 439.
45. Id. at 443-51.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2006).
47. THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supranote 5,
48. Id.

at 447.
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land prior to the conveyance that separated the land into two tracts. 49 Koonce
v. JE.Brite Estate0 provides a good example of this requirement.
In Koonce, the owner of a dominate estate (Brite Estate) filed a declaratory
judgment action against owners of a servient estate (Koonce) seeking an order
that the Brite Estate had an easement implied from necessity over Koonce's
52
land.5' In that case, Brite Estate's land consisted of ten landlocked acres.
After his wife passed away, Brite became the sole owner of the ten acres under
his wife's will. On the death of Brite, the ten acres became part of the Brite
Estate-the party seeking the way of necessity. The servient estate was a 142acre tact owned by Koonce. The 142 acres was part of an original 284 acres
owned by Koonce and Brite's wife as tenants in common. Brite's wife's
undivided half interest in the 284 acres, along with the ten acres, passed to
Brite under her will at the same time. At that point Brite partitioned the 284
acres between himself and Koonce. The 142 acres set aside for Koonce was
the land constituting the servient estate over which the Brite Estate sought a
way of necessity.53
Although its ten acres were landlocked, the Supreme Court of Texas ruled
against the Brite Estate.54 Koonce successfully claimed there was no unity of
ownership with respect to Brite Estate's ten acres and Koonce's 124 acres.
There was no evidence the ten-acre tract and the original 284 acres were ever
owned as a single unit by Brite.55 Consequently, there was no evidence of
unity of title between the dominant and servient estate necessary to establish
a claim to a way of necessity.
Unity of title presents the fundamental problem to finding a way of
necessity over Indian lands. Ways of necessity usually apply as between two
private parties. That is, unity of title must be found in those private persons
and conveyance of the burdened land must have come from that unity.
However, when it comes to a claim for a way of necessity over Indian lands,
unity of title could only be found in the federal government. And, for the
reasons discussed below, it is exceedingly doubtful that the common law
requirement of unity of title can be found in the federal government or any
sovereign.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Hollywyle Ass'n, Inc. v. Hollister, 164 Conn. 389, 398 (1973).
663 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1984).
Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Rules of InterpretationConcerning Government Property andFederal
Indian Law
It is well settled that federal statutes granting proprietary interests are to be
construed in favor of the government, and in particular, nothing passes by
implication. 6 Moreover, "[t]he Government, which holds its interests.., in
trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary
court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually owned
pieces of property; and officers who have no authority at all to dispose of
Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose
its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act."57 There is
no reason to assume this interpretive rule differs when the government holds
the interests in trust for particular Indian tribes and their members, as opposed
to the public at large.
These general principles, which reveal a markedly distinct treatment in the
law between government lands on the one hand and private lands on the other,
are as a rule even more stringent and divergent in the case of Indian trust
lands.58 Anyone receiving a right or interest in Indian lands only receives
those rights specifically granted by the federal government.5 9 Any intent to
deprive Indian tribes of rights in land must be clearly and unequivocally stated
and language appearing in such grants and statutes is not to be construed to the
prejudice of Indians.6" As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
stated, "The whole purpose of trust land is to protect the land from
unauthorized alienation. 61
Federal statutory law is replete with examples of regulations designed to
curb the unauthorized alienation of Indian trust lands.62 As early as the
seventeenth century, "colonial legislatures restrained private land purchases
from the Indians, requiring all acquisitions of Indian land to be licensed or
approved in advance by the colonial authorities."'
Since 1790, federal

56. See cases cited supra note 19.
57. Unites States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947).
58. Unites States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354 (1941).
59. Id.
60. Id.; see United States v. Shoshone, 304 U.S. 111 (1938); Leavenworth, Lowery &
Galveston R.R. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733 (1875).
61. Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir.
1991).
62. See Act ofMar. 2, 1899,ch. 374, 30 Stat. 990 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 312
(2006)).
63. COHEN, supra note 17, at 508.
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regulations have been in place prohibiting the sale of Indian lands without the
express approval of the Secretary of the Interior, even if tribes consent to the
sales. 6" More recently, Congress has specifically regulated the area of rightsof-way over Indian lands by way of a statute that permits the Secretary of the
Interior to grant rights-of-way only if certain conditions are met.65 Among the
statutory conditions is that the Secretary first obtain the express consent of the
tribe in the case of tribal trust lands or individual Indians in the case of allotted
trust lands.66
Given this background of interpretive rules governing federal laws, blackletter federal Indian law, and the enactment of specific statutes regulating the
disposition of proprietary interests in Indian trust land (and of servitudes in
particular), it is doubtful Indian trust lands can be burdened or otherwise
divested by mere implication. Nonetheless, for sake of argument, if federal
common law doctrines otherwise generally permit ways of necessity over
federal lands one might assume the principle applies equally to Indian trust
lands. At least, if this were the case, there would be a much stronger argument
that those principles apply to lands in Indian Country. However, it is doubtful
that federal common law permits the doctrine of ways of necessity to be
applied to federally owned lands.
C. Where Is the Unity Of Title?
The application of common law rules governing implied servitudes, and
ways of necessity in particular, to federal lands is questionable at best. The
argument has been raised on occasion, but outside a few problematic federal
district and state court decisions, the issue has never been directly or
conclusively decided. The core issue is whether unity of title can be found in
the government.
1. FederalCases
The most thorough analysis of the problem of unity of title being found in
the federal government is the 1976 Interior Board of Land Appeals case Sun
Studs, Inc. 67 In 1973, Sun Studs applied for a right-of-way to construct a road
across federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land. 68 The BLM denied

64.
§ 177).
65.
66.
67.
68.

Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
25 U.S.C. § 323.
Id. § 324.
Sun Studs, Inc., 83 Interior Dec. 518 (1976).
Id. at 518.
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the application.69 Sun Studs appealed that denial to the Interior Board of Land
Appeals.7" Sun Studs owned land bounded on the east by BLM land; both
plots were bounded to the south by a river.7' The company maintained that it
needed a right-of-way because there was no road access to its property. 2
While the application was denied for environmental reasons, which the
company challenged, it also raised the argument that it was a successor in
interest to the original patentees of the land and as such it was entitled to an
easement by way of necessity for access to its land."7 4 The BLM argued that
ways of necessity are not applicable to federal lands.
The Interior Board of Land Appeals, in siding with the federal government,
carefully analyzed the problem of unity of title being found in the government.
The court's analysis is particularly convincing insofar as it readily
distinguishes cases cited in support of a finding of a way of necessity75 , shows
the law's treatment of private parties and the federal government is
significantly different with respect to land owners,76 and shows that Congress
has specifically regulated rights-of-way across federal lands,77 all boding
against a finding that a way of necessity can be implied against the
government.
The company in Sun Studs primarily relied on UnitedStates v. Dunn7' as the
controlling authority for its claim that unity of title could be found in the
government or that an easement could otherwise be implied against the
government. 79 However, the only discussion of the issue in Dunn is in a
footnote that reads: "[S]ince the government did not, in our judgment, raise the
point.., we have not discussed it in the opinion, but nevertheless did give it
due consideration and concluded that it lacked merit."8 Understandably, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has since held in FitzgeraldLiving
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.at 518-19.
73. Id. at 519.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 521.
76. Id. at 523 (noting the government "holds its interests... in trust for all the people," and
"is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for
private disputes over individually owned pieces of property" (quoting United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947)).
77. Id. at 524.
78. 478 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1973).
79. Sun Studs, Inc., 83 Interior Dec. at 519.
80. Id.at 445 n.2.
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Trust that the Dunn footnote does not constitute a holding on the issue and
further held that it has never decided the issue.8
The company also relied on Bydlon v. United States, 2 Superior Oil Co. v.
United States, 3 Herrin v. Sieben, 4 and Violet v. Martin5 to support its
position.86 As the Interior Board of Land Appeals noted, Superior Oil and
Bydlon never addressed the problem of unity being found in the federal
government, and the federal government was not a party in the Montana
cases.8 7 In addition, the Violet court gave no analysis for its claim that an
easement can be implied against the federal government, 8 and the Herrin
court asserted, without further discussion, there is no difference between a
grant by the federal government and a grant by a private person to another.8 9
Ultimately, the Interior Board of Land Appeals found that unity of title
could not be found in the federal government for several convincing reasons.
First, in the absence of a specific statute conferring such a right, there is
nothing to suggest that Congress intended for implied easements to be created
when it granted public lands." Second, "Congress has not ignored the
problem of access to public lands," as there are many statutes explicitly
granting such rights in particular circumstances. 9' Third, "[t]he fact that
Congress has enacted specific statutes for specific rights-of-way weighs
'
against a finding of an easement by implication."92

81. Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Thus, Dunn is at most persuasive authority for the argument that an easement by necessity
may be taken against the United States when it owns the servient tenement.")
82. 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
83. 353 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1965).
84. 127 P. 323 (Mont. 1912).
85. 205 P. 221 (Mont. 1922).
86. Sun Studs, Inc., 83 Interior Dec. 518, 521 (1976).
87. Id.
88. Violet, 205 P. at 223.
89. Herrin, 127 P. at 328 ("The grant by the federal government to the railway company,
so far as the question at issue is concerned, does not differ from a grant by one private person
to another.").
90. Sun Studs, Inc., 83 Interior Dec. at 291.
91. Id. (identifying specific circumstances where access has been granted to public lands
by statute).
92. Id.at 291-92 ("Congress has not enacted any statute which provides a general right of
The
access across the public lands to all grantees, or their successors, of public land ....
Department ofthe Interior can alienate interests in public land only within the limits authorized
by law. We can find no law which grants or confirms such an implied easement across public
land as alleged by appellant. Therefore, we do not recognize any vested right for an easement
by way of necessity under the patents which appellant's predecessors in interest received from
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Similarly, in Indian Country, Congress has heavily regulated the area of
easements over trust lands but has notably failed to pass any legislation
remotely suggesting an easement can be found or conferred by mere
implication. 3 This, in conjunction with background rules of interpretation
concerning Indian lands and federal lands in general, make it nearly certain
that easements cannot be implied against trust lands absent a congressional
statute expressly providing for one.
Nevertheless, there are several problematic federal court cases. In Montana
Wilderness Ass 'n v. U.S. ForestService, the United States District Court for
the District of Montana directly addressed the issue of implied ways of
necessity over federal lands and concluded they were permissible.94 However,
the court's decision relied on Superior Oil and Dunn as persuasive authority
for the proposition that a way of necessity could be found against the federal
government. 95 As noted in the discussion of Sun Studs, reliance on either of
these cases is problematic, and insofar as the court relied on these cases to
support its holding, it is questionable. But there is an additional curiosity in
the Montana Wilderness court's ruling that strongly suggests there are no
implied easements against federal lands.
After citing SuperiorOil and Dunn and holding that ways of necessity can
run against the government, the court went on to say this alone did not
establish the easement (despite finding that the elements for a way of necessity
had been met). 96 This means, at the very least, that the common law elements
necessary to establish a way of necessity are not sufficient when the issue
involves the government. An additional factor must be addressed-that of the
intent of Congress when it passed the statute authorizing the land grant.97
This, however, confuses the issue.
As will be discussed in more detail below, the United States Supreme
Court's Leo Sheep case indicates that a way of necessity and an easement
implied from congressional intent are two different and independent means of
establishing the existence of an easement.98 Otherwise, the Court would not
have concluded that the issue of necessity was of little significance to the case

the United States.") (internal citations omitted).
93. 25 U.S.C. §§ 311-328 (2006).
94. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 496 F. Supp. 880 (D. Mont. 1980), aff'd
655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981).
95. Id. at 885.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 681 (1979).
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and that the real issue was one of congressional intent.9 9 If the common law
elements for a way of necessity do not in themselves establish a way of
necessity when unity of title is in the government, then the common law
doctrine does not create the easement. If congressional intent must first be
determined, then that is the beginning and end of the inquiry. Leo Sheep
establishes this as an independent basis."° Consequently, the Montana
Wilderness case is confused and of dubious persuasive value.
Moreover, the federal government appealed the decision in Montana
Wilderness.' The appellate court side-stepped the implied way of necessity
issue and instead found the plaintiff had a statutorily conferred right of
access."°2 Between the district court ruling and the appellate court holding, the
United States Attorney General issued an opinion on the matter that
specifically addressed the way of necessity issue, finding that a way of
necessity does not run against the federal government. 0 3 The Attorney
General concluded that, like the Court in Leo Sheep, applying the way of
necessity doctrine against federal lands is strained and of little significance
given that the real issue is the intent of Congress."
For these reasons reliance on Montana Wilderness for the proposition that
a way of necessity can run against the federal government, or where unity of
title can only be found in a sovereign, is doubly dubious.
Another problematic federal case is the District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington's unpublished memorandum decision andjudgment in
Brendale v. Olney. °5 Unlike many of the cases discussed above, this case
directly concerned a right of access across Indian trust lands." 6 In particular,
it involved a right of access to a BIA road that ran across trust lands to the
petitioner's fee lands.0 7
Like the Montana Wilderness court, it
99. Id.

100. Id. at 680-81.
101. Mont. Wilderness Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (1981).
102. Id at 952.
103. 43 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 243 (1980).
104. Id. at 259-60 ("These same reasons lead me to conclude, as did the Court in Leo Sheep,
that the doctrine of easements by necessity as applicable to Federal lands is 'somewhat strained,
and ultimately of little significance' and that the 'pertinent inquiry ... is the intent of
Congress."')
105. See Brendale v. Olney, No. C-78-145 (E.D. Wash. filed Mar. 3, 1981) (Memorandum
Decision and Judgment).
106. Id.
107. For a discussion about why the road's status as a BIA road should have rendered the
issue moot, see M. Brent Leonhard, The Public Nature of Indian Reservation Roads (Some
Initial Thoughts), OR. ST. B. INDIAN L. SEC., http://www.osbar-indianlaw.org/files/ThePublic
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problematically relied on Dunn and Superior Oil.' However, the court also
cited Kinscherffv. UnitedStates ' for the proposition that an easement can be
implied if it can be found from congressional intent."' As discussed below
this is the correct line of analysis, however, the opposite conclusion should be
reached. The court went on to cite ConfederatedSalish and Kootenai Tribes
v. Namen"' as holding that Congress intended grants of allotted lands to
include the conveyance of customary common law easements."' The court's
reliance on Namen, however, was misplaced.
Namen presents a unique situation and cannot stand for the proposition that
the common law right of a way of necessity applies to federal lands, but rather
that the well-established federal common law governing riparian ownership
rights applies to tribal lands." 3 The Namen court notably cited Potomac
Steamboat Co. v. Upper Potomac Steamboat Co.1" to support its conclusion
that Congress intended to grant access and wharfage rights when issuing
riparian land grants on the Flathead Reservation." 5 Potomac makes it clear
that since the early days of the United States of America, the nature of riparian
ownership carries with it the right to access the navigable part of the river from
the front of the lot in question, the right to landing, and wharfage." 6 That is
to say, it is not an easement implied from anything, but rather part and parcel
of ownership of riparian property-it is one of the property rights that come
with riparian ownership." 7 Certainly, with this background federal common
law governing riparian ownership, Congress must have intended that an
allotment of riparian land carries with it the same ownership rights as any
other piece of riparian land unless it expressly said otherwise. That is
significantly different than what may have been intended if the issue involved
non-riparian lands.
In Burdess v. United States the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas also found that an implied way of necessity could run

NatureOflndianReservationRoads.pdf.
108. Brendale v. Olney, No. C-78-145, at 6 (E.D. Wash. filed Mar. 3, 1981) (Memorandum
Decision and Judgment).
109. 586 F. 2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978).
110. Brendale,No. C-78-145, at 6.
111. 380 F. Supp. 452, 461 (D. Mont. 1974).
112. Brendale,No. C-78-145, at 6.
113. Id. at 6-7.
114. 109 U.S. 672 (1884).
115. Id. at 682.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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against the federal government."'
However, the Burdess court merely
proclaimed such a right existed and cited Montana Wilderness and City of
Denver v. Bergland"9 as a basis for the right. 2 ' Montana Wilderness is
mentioned above. The court's reliance on Bergland is troubling insofar as
Bergland never addressed the issue or otherwise held an implied way of
necessity could run against the government.
The Bergland court inconclusively addressed the possibility of applying
estoppel against the federal government, 2 ' but it never directly addressed the
issue of an implied easement of necessity against the government.12 Rather,
the court dealt with the issue as to whether jurisdiction could be had under the
federal Quiet Title Act. 23 Nothing in the discussion of easements and the
Quiet Title Act even broaches whether implied easements of necessity can run
against the government. Of course, other than in Indian Country, anyone
attempting to quiet title in federal lands by way of an assertion of an easement
claim based on the common law doctrine of the way of necessity would find
federal jurisdiction to hear the matter in the Quiet Title Act.'2 4 However, this
has nothing to do with whether a way of necessity can be found against a
sovereign.
The most recent case to address the issue is McFarland v. Kempthorne,
another Montana federal district court case. 25 In McFarland,the defendants
cited Leo Sheep and the 1980 United States Attorney General Opinion for the
proposition that an implied easement from necessity cannot run against the
federal government. 26 Instead of noting that both opinions relied on by the
defense state that the issue is not one of a common law way of necessity but
one of congressional intent, the court curiously claimed Leo Sheep and the
Attorney General's opinion did not directly address
the issue.' 27 The court
28
went on to cite Montana Wilderness as precedent.
Insofar as McFarlandrelies on the earlier Montana case and insofar as the
earlier case is doubtful for the reasons stated above (namely that the issue of

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Burdess v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
517 F. Supp. 155 (D. Colo. 1981).
Burdess, 553 F. Supp. at 648.
Bergland, 517 F. Supp. at 194-97.
Id. at 175.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2006).
McFarland v. Kempthorne, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Mont. 2006).
Id. at 1020.
Id.
Id.
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congressional intent-an independent basis under Leo Sheep-was the factor
carrying all the weight as to whether an implied easement existed), it, too, is
of dubious persuasive value. It is, however, informative when it comes to
Indian land issues because the defendant in the case was the Department of the
Interior, which appears to be maintaining, consistent with Sun Studs, Inc., that
ways of necessity cannot run against the federal government. Perhaps the
attorney representing the government in McFarland should speak with the
solicitors at Interior about this clear conflict in their positions.
2. State Cases
The majority of state courts grappling with the unity of title issue have held
that it cannot be found in a sovereign. 2 9 The first court to directly address the
issue was the Tennessee Supreme Court in Pearne v. Coal Creek Mining &
ManufacturingCo.13

In 1837 Tennessee granted to Moore & Spessard a 2000-acre parcel.' In
1848, the state granted to Mr. Richmond 5000 acres and to Mr. Wiley another
5000 acres. 32 Inopportunely, the land granted in 1848 left the Moore &
Spessard acreage landlocked. 33 In 1855 Moore & Spessard nonetheless
conveyed 200 acres of its landlocked parcel to Mr. Diggs.134 Mr. Diggs' land,
as it turned out, had coal deposits about 600 feet below the surface. 35
Unfortunately for him, that tract lay near the top of a mountain and had no
frontage through which he could remove the coal.' 36 For this reason, he sought
a way of necessity over and through the adjacent lands to try and profitably

129. See Bully Hill Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Brunson, 87 P. 237, 238 (Cal. App.
1906); Guess v. Azar, 57 So. 2d 443,444-45 (Fla. 1952) ("It would be ruinous to establish the
precedent contended for, since by it every grantee from the earliest history of the State, and
those who succeed to his title, would have an implied right-of-way over all surrounding and
adjacent lands held under junior grants, even to the utmost limits of the State."); Cont'l Enter.
Inc. v. Cain, 296 N.E.2d 170,171 (Ind. App. 1973); Dudleyv. Meggs, 153 P. 1121,1122 (Okla.
1915) (noting that a way of necessity requires past ownership of two tracts by one individual,
but that "the two tracts of land must have at one time belonged to some one person other than
the government"); Peame v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 S.W. 402 (Tenn. 1891); State
v. Black Bros., 297 S.W. 213, 218-19 (Tex. 1927).
130. Pearne v. Coal Creek Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 S.W. 402 (Tenn. 1891).
131. Id. at 402.
132. Id. at 403.
133. 1d.
134. Id.
at 402.
135. Id. at 404.
136. Id.
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mine the coal.'
In particular, Mr. Diggs contended that the State of
Tennessee impliedly granted such an easement to Moore & Spessard when it
conveyed the 2000 acres of which his 200 acres is a part while retaining the
10,000 acres engulfing his land. 3
In 1891 the issue worked its way up to the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
which held that unity of title cannot be found in the state government. 3 9 The
court's primary reason for the holding was if unity of title could be found in
the state, every grantee would have an implied right-of-way over every
40
adjacent parcel held under junior grants.
The same reasoning applies equally well in the case of Indian lands. Every
allotment or fee parcel would potentially have an implied easement over all
surrounding and adjacent junior allotments, absent the discontinuation of
necessity. It is hard to imagine this was the intent of the federal government
or Congress in the original grant of the various parcels, whether or not it would
be useful or appropriate in a given case. Those receiving the parcels, as well
as the government in granting the parcels, could easily have included or
insisted on a recorded easement in the grant or at least have ensured that the
needed rights-of-way were reflected in the survey of each tract.
One commentator has criticized Pearnefor ignoring that an easement ends
when necessity ends.'' This is hardly consoling, particularly for those who
live in Indian Country. Necessity can persist through multiple generations and
changes in land ownership. The reason why these issues persist today is
because from time to time individuals find themselves proud owners of land
their predecessors in interest accessed through neighboring lands by way of,
at best, a license. If those who are persuaded by this criticism believe the
issuance of a revocable license to cross land by some surrounding property
owner at some point in the past defeats the application of the way of necessity
doctrine then, for all practical purposes today, a way of necessity will never be
found when unity of title is to be found in the sovereign. Assuming a mere
license does not defeat the necessity requirement, Pearneremains convincing.
The problem faced on the checkerboard that is Indian Country today arises
when a landlocked parcel changes hands and the former friendly bordering
neighbor decides they do not want the new owner crossing their land. Instead

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
3 RICHARD R. POwELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY

ed., Lexis Nexis (2000)).
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of a license the new owner finds a locked gate. In the very real cases that
persist today, if unity of title can be found in the government, then it remains
true that "every grantee, from the earliest history of the [reservation], and those
who succeed to his title, would have an implied right-of-way over all
surrounding and adjacent lands held under junior grants, even to the utmost
limits of the [reservation]"' 142, and more importantly, that this was the intent of
the government at the time the lands were allotted. This hardly seems
plausible.
Despite the majority view, courts in Arkansas, Missouri, and Montana have
been cited for coming to the opposite conclusion. 43 However, a quick review
of those cases reveals the paucity of reliance on them for the proposition that
unity of title can be found in a sovereign.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Ark. State Highway Commissioner v.
Marshall held that unity of title could be found in the State. 44 However, the
court's conclusion rests on a lone cite to the court's 1965 Kesner decision.'4 5
In Kesner the issue of unity of title in the government was neither raised nor
47
discussed.'" The Kesner court simply assumed it was permissible.1
Consequently, to rely on the Marshall opinion is ultimately to rely on a mere
assumption.
Snyder v. Warford,14' a case decided by the Missouri Supreme Court, has
also been cited for the minority view. Reading the case, it is readily apparent
that it involved a constitutional challenge to a way of necessity statute. 49 The
defendant claimed the statute permitted an unconstitutional taking. 5 ' The
court's decision turned not on the issue of unity of title being in the sovereign,
but on the nature of a fee simple title and the application of the common law
doctrine of ways of necessity.' 1 It provides no analysis as to why a way of
necessity can be found where unity of title only existed in the sovereign.

142. Pearne, 18 S.W. at 404.
143. See Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Marshall, 485 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Ark. 1972);
Snyder v. Warford, 11 Mo. 513, 514 (1848); Violet v. Martin, 205 P. 221, 223 (Mont. 1922).
144. Marshall,485 S.W. 2d 740.
145. Id.at 743.
146. Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Kesner, 388 S.W.2d 905 (Ark. 1965).
147. Id.
148. 11 Mo. 513 (1848).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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Finally, on this issue, the Montana Supreme Court in the case of Violet v.
Martin'52 has been cited to support the minority view. However, the entirety
of the Violet court's analysis consisted of stating that unity of title could be
found in the federal government but that the case before them did not warrant
it because there was no necessity.'53 The case was later overruled in Simonson
v. McDonald"s insofar as it might have been read for the proposition that a
way of necessity could be found when the power of eminent domain is
available to the government.
The conclusion to be drawn from a review of the cases addressing the
problem of unity of title being found in the sovereign is those that directly
address and analyze the issue come to the conclusion that unity cannot be
found in the sovereign. Those cited for the proposition that such a unity can
be had either do not address or analyze the problem or cite to cases that do not
themselves address or analyze the problem.
D. The So-Called "PublicPolicy" and "Harmony" Justification
Some commentators have opined that allowing unity of title to be found in
a sovereign is consistent with two purported theories underlying the way of
necessity doctrine and presumably for this reason the doctrine does or should
apply to federal lands.'55 Those theories are that an easement is implied
because it is presumed the parties intended for such an easement to exist and
public policy favors the full utilization of the land.'56 This is problematic,
particularly in the case of tribes.
As for consistency with the inferred intent theory, when unity of title is in
the government it is highly unlikely the government intended for easements to
exist in this situation for the reasons set forth above and explained in Pearne
and Rindge. Furthermore, such a doctrine is flagrantly inconsistent with the
common law's markedly different treatment of government lands from private
lands, the most relevant being the doctrine that nothing is to pass by
implication.'5 7 The difference in treatment and inconsistency with existing law
is heightened all the more when those government lands are held in trust for

152. Violet v. Martin, 205 P. 221 (Mont. 1922).
153. Id. at 223.
154. Simonson v. McDonald, 311 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1957).
155. 3 HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 793 (1939 &

Supp. 2004); ELY & BRUCE, supra note 15, § 4.7.
156. ELY & BRUCE, supra note 15, § 4.7.

157. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
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the benefit of Indians.' Finally, if the question is one of inferred intent, when
the transaction in question pertains to the intent of the federal government due
to unity of title only being found in the sovereign, then the real question is the
intent of Congress in enacting the statute giving rise to the power to dispose
of the federal lands and not the intent of the government and grantee at the
time of a particular conveyance.
The idea that a public policy favoring the "full utilization of land" could
result in an implicit alienation of proprietary rights in Indian lands ought to
make every Indian Country advocate, practitioner, and tribal member cringe
in horror. This is the kind of "public policy" that historically was used to
justify decimation of tribes and the Indian people.' 59 Moreover, what public
policy should dictate is an issue for the policy makers to decide. Certainly
those of an environmental bent may deem that the better public policy is to
leave the nation's remaining public lands as under utilized as possible. That
a rule of law could be created out of whole cloth because a court deems it
expedient or appropriate for "public policy" reasons ought to make everyone
else cringe in horror at such a brazen assumption of the legislature's role. This
is especially problematic when the legislature has regulated the area and
conspicuously has not provided for a way of necessity statute, as in the case
of Indian Country. " And as noted in Snyder, states have already created ways
of necessity statutes that can, if the legislature deems appropriate as a matter
of public policy, include the creation of easements across the sovereign's
lands. At the very least, what the better public policy would be in these
circumstances (whether to allow for or prohibit a way of necessity to run
against government lands and Indian trust lands in particular) is not obvious,
and rational minds certainly differ on the issue. In such circumstances, it
would seem the courts ought to be the last ones dictating which policy is to
rule the day.
In the end, the issue as to whether an implied easement by necessity can
exist when the unity of title is in the federal government remains unresolved.
However, those cases giving an in-depth analysis of the issue conclude,
rightfully in the opinion of the author, that such easements cannot be implied
when it comes to the sovereign. Those cases going the other way are often less
well reasoned and at times confused (e.g., Montana Wilderness). And finally,

158. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
159. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and RenaissanceOrigins of the Status of the
American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1983).
160. See Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 374,30 Stat. 990 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 312
(2006)).
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the notion that governmental unity is consistent with the supposed twin
theories of the common law unity of title requirement is highly questionable
and, in this author's opinion, wrong on both counts-especially when it comes
to Indian Country.
E. Leo Sheep and the Argumentfrom CongressionalIntent
In 1979 the United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to touch on the
issue of unity of title but did not directly resolve it. Nonetheless, given the
Court's holding, the problem of unity of title being found in the federal
government is no longer the thicket it initially appears to be. In Leo Sheep Co.
v. United States'61 Justice Rehnquist, penning a unanimous opinion,
proclaimed the appropriate inquiry in these situations to be Congress's intent
62
when it enacted the law giving rise to the original land grant.
The facts underlying Leo Sheep are somewhat different then the typical
implied easement case. The federal government had constructed a public road
on a railroad company's property and the Wyoming district court found that
it had done so wrongly. 63 The government conceded that there was no
express reservation for an easement when it initially granted the land to the
railroad."6 Consequently, the government was left with arguing that it had a
65
way of necessity across the railroad's lands.1
The Court noted a critical problem in the government's theory: there is no
166
necessity because the government has the power of eminent domain.
Consequently, application of the theory was strained and ultimately of little
significance. 167 Interestingly, in coming to this conclusion, the Court cited
Pearneand Black Bros.--cases finding that unity of title cannot be found in
the federal government-with apparent approval, but cited them for the issue
concerning eminent domain. 68 The relevant question for the Court was not
one of necessity or unity of title, but rather what Congress intended when it
69
granted the land to the railroad.
Justice Rehnquist hits the nail on the head when he states that this is not the
real issue; the issue is whether Congress intended to grant easements when it
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 678.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. atn.17.
Id. at 680.
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passed the laws under which the grants occurred. 7 If there is congressional
intent, that should be the end of the inquiry. 7' In that case it does not matter
if the common law elements of a way of necessity are met. If there is no
congressional intent one would think that concludes the analysis of what the
intent of the parties were at the time of conveyance, regardless of whether an
individual is left landlocked. Furthermore, if the issue is the intent of the
parties at the time of conveyance, as is certainly the primary issue in ways of
necessity cases at common law'7 , when the transaction in question involves
a conveyance from the government the question really is the intent of the
government. Such intent would have to be found in the statute giving rise to
the power to dispose of the federal lands in the first place, e.g., Congress's
intent at the time it passed the law. It certainly is not the intent between the
grantee and a particular government official at the time of the conveyance.
A few months after the decision in Leo Sheep the U.S. District Court for the
District of Utah issued its decision in Utah v. Andrus.'73 In that case the
United States filed suit seeking a restraining order to prevent the lessee of state
school trust lands from constructing a road. 74 The school trust lands in
question were landlocked by federal lands.' 75 The court found an implied
easement existed for the construction of the roadway. However, rather then
focus on a common law way of necessity, the court turned its attention to
Congress's intent when it passed the legislation enabling school land grants.
The court noted that while land grants by the federal government are typically
strictly construed, when it comes to school trust lands, the laws are to be
liberally construed. 76 It went on to note that the primary purpose Congress
had in mind when enacting the legislation was to put new states on equal
footing with the original thirteen colonies by allowing the states to generate
funds to support schools by the sale and use of trust lands. 77 Given that

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. While both cases and commentators have stated that the way of necessity doctrine is
founded on two theories (implied intent and public policy favoring full utilization of land),
implied intent is always a central issue but public policy concerns, when mentioned, only serve
as additional justification for the rule. However, Buss v. Dyer, 125 Mass. 287 (1877), appears
to lay the foundation for the rule solely on the purported public policy "that no land should be
left inaccessible for purposes of cultivation." Id. at 291.
173. 486 F. Supp. 995 (D. Utah 1979).
174. Id. at 999.
175. Id.at 999-1000.
176. Id. at 1001-02.
177. Id. at 1002.
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backdrop, the court concluded that Congress intended for the State of Utah to
have access to school lands, even if by implication, as the lands would
otherwise become worthless, thereby defeating the purpose of the grant.17
While Andrus is sometimes cited in support of the claim that a way of
necessity can be had against the federal government, it is clear the decision
turned on the intent of Congress in passing the legislation governing school
land grants and not on the common law elements for a finding of a way of
necessity.' 79
IV Easements Impliedfrom CongressionalIntent
Both the Attorney General in the 1980 Opinion on the Montana Wilderness
case and Justice Rehnquist's decision in Leo Sheep appear to have exposed
what the real issue is--or ought to be-in these cases, namely whether
Congress intended for easements to exist in the original grants. This was
certainly the case with school land grants in Andrus. However, it is doubtful
in the case of Indian trust lands.
As previously stated federal statutes granting proprietary interests pass
nothing by implication and are to be strictly construed in the government's
favor. This is especially the case when it comes to Indian trust lands. Since
the late eighteenth century the United States Congress has passed legislation
limiting the ability for these lands to be alienated. The whole point of having
these lands in trust, as aptly put by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Imperial Granite, is to protect the land from unauthorized alienation.8
Additionally, Congress has expressly provided for a method whereby one can
seek rights of way across trust lands.'
Those provisions require consent of
either the tribe in the case of tribal trust lands or the majority individual
allottees in the case of allotted trust lands. If Congress wanted to provide for
ways of necessity across Indian lands it could have done so by explicit
legislation. What is more, the problem of rights of access was nothing new to
the federal government when it allotted Indian lands under the General
Allotment Act in 1887.112 If it intended to grant rights-of-way it certainly

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See cases cited supra note 31.
181. See Act of Mar. 2, 1899, ch. 374,30 Stat. 990 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 312
(2006)).
182. This article does not address the allotment acts concerning specific tribes, such as the
Slater Act of 1885 affecting the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation.
However, the specific acts were the template from which the General Allotment Act was born
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could have done so expressly either in the legislation or in the actual survey
of each allotted parcel.
A. The HomesteadAct
Any argument that Congress intended for there to be implied rights of
access over tribal trust lands when it passed the various Indian Allotment Acts
would indubitably turn on factors that apply with equal force to the Homestead
Act. That act was passed shortly before the General Allotment Act, involved
lands in the same region as those in the General Allotment Act, and its purpose
was to grant public land to individuals in fee simple for use as homes and
farmland, which is at least one of the ultimate purposes of the Allotment Act.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jenks
specifically addressed the Homestead Act as it pertained to implied
easements.183 The defendant there claimed the government granted his
predecessors an interest in an implied easement to use access roads to reach his
land.'8 4 Specifically, Jenks claimed the language of the Homestead Act, which
gave individuals 160 acres of public land if they agreed to live on and improve
the land for a certain period of time, supported a finding that Congress
intended to grant an implied access easement for patented land. 5 However,
the court came to a different conclusion. The court noted that while an access
right was implied if necessary to carry out the purpose for which land was
86
granted, it did not follow that the right of access was an implied easement.
Citing an earlier decision in the same case and the 1890 United States Supreme
Court case of Buford v. Houtz, the court decided what was granted was an
implied license to cross open public lands.'87 In Buford the Supreme Court
specifically held that individuals had an implied license, derived from what
was then a nearly 100-year-old custom, to cross or otherwise use open public
lands for grazing. 8 Individuals, however, did not have an easement over
government lands.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came to the same conclusion in
Fitzgerald.89 In Fitzgerald,the plaintiff argued that Congress intended for an
and it is doubtful one would find a basis to treat lands allotted under the specific acts differently
than those under the general act, at least with regard to implied servitudes in land.
183. United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348 (10th Cir. 1997).
184. Id. at 1354.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326(1890).
189. Fitzgerald Living Trust v. United States, 460 F.3d 1259, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 2006).
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inholder to have access to their property over public lands when it passed the
Homestead Act.' 9 The court agreed with the plaintiff, but like the court in
Jenks, found the nature of the access right was simply a license. 9' The court
also cited Buford for the rule that the access right settlers had under the
Homestead Act was a license to cross open public lands. However, the court
went on to cite Light v. United States,'92 which further clarified Buford by
holding that the government's grant of a license to the public to use open
public lands did not confer a vested public right.'93 Consequently, the
Fitzgeraldcourt concluded that Congress did not intend to grant an implied
easement over public lands when it passed the Homestead Act.' 94 The court
also held that the general public license did not somehow transform into a
vested right to an easement over adjacent land when the land in question was
patented. 95 Finally, the court noted its conclusion was supported by the fact
that Congress, after enacting the Homestead Act, passed legislation that
specifically granted a right of access over federal lands, which would not have
been necessary if Congress intended for such a right to have existed by
implication under the Homestead Act. 96
These federal appellate and Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
Homestead Act are insightful when looking at the General Allotment Act. The
Homestead Act was passed in 1862 and was designed to open public lands to
settlement by those who were willing to live on the land and make
improvements for at least five years. 1' Certainly those settlers were in need
of access to those lands. Regardless, the right conveyed for such purposes was
not in the nature of an easement, but a license to traverse public lands.' 9 And
as noted by the Ninth Circuit in Fitzgerald, subsequent acts by Congress
granting a process for obtaining rights of access over federal lands would have
made no sense. Likewise, in the case of Indian Country, if indeed the General
Allotment Act granted allottees vested implied easements across bordering
lands, then subsequent enactments providing for a process whereby one can
obtain a right of access over Indian lands would make absolutely no sense. 99

190. Id. at 1266.

191. Id.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
Fitzgerald,460 F.3d at 1266.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1265-66.
United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir. 1997).
Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
25 U.S.C. §§ 323-324 (2006).
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Moreover, the Indian Allotment Acts were enacted in the same general period
as the Homestead Act."° At the time there was a great deal of open public
land settlers customarily used for access, grazing, and the like."0 ' There is no
reason to suppose the intent of Congress in the case of the Homestead Act
differed in the case of the Indian Allotment Acts on the singular issue of
ingress and egress to allotted or granted lands. Indeed, Indian allotted lands
and lands open to settlement under the Homestead Act likely bordered each
other in many instances. And finally, as will be shown, one of the primary
purported purposes of the General Allotment Act was to "civilize" the Indian
population by giving them land on which they could farm, settle, and own
individually in a similar fashion as the white settlers under the Homestead Act.
B. FederalPoliciesPrecedingthe Allotment Acts
To understand what the intent of Congress was when it passed the General
Allotment Act it is necessary to look at the federal policies and
recommendations preceding its passage. Fundamentally, the purpose was to
assist in solving the "Indian question"-that question being how to "civilize"
the Indians. 02 On November 27, 1851, eleven years before the passage of the
Homestead Act, Indian Commissioner Lea framed the question and national
discourse in the years preceding the passage of the General Allotment Act in
all its ugliness and stated the answer must include the "incorporation" of
individual Indians into the American population. 0 3
After the "question" and proposed "answer" had initially been set,
Commissioner Lea's successors continued to voice similar racist views.
On November 6, 1858, Indian Commissioner Mix in his annual report wrote
there were three errors marking the federal policy toward Indians: removal,
giving them too much land to be held in common, and giving them too much
money for lands the Indians ceded to the government.20 These "errors" in turn
were seen as impeding the government's ability to "domesticate and civilize

200. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
201. Buford, 133 U.S. at 320.
202. DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES INDIAN POuCY 86 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 2d
ed. 1990) (extract from Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Nov. 27, 1851)).
203. Id. ("The great question, How shall the Indians be civilized? yet remains without a
satisfactory answer.... I therefore leave the subject for the present, remarking, only, that any
plan for the civilization of our Indians will, in my judgment, be fatally defective, if it does not
provide, in the most efficient manner, first, for their ultimate incorporation into the great body
of our citizen population.")
204. Id. at 92-93 (extract from Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Nov.
6, 1858)).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2009

486

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

them" because it prevented the Indians from gaining an understanding of
individual property ownership.2 5
On November 23, 1869, the Board of Indian Commissioners issued a report
that stated the reason "Indians will not work" is because they have been taught
that any product of their labor would be taken away by the white man and they
should be put on reservations, taught about individual ownership of land to
encourage agricultural production, and taxed as citizens of the United States. 0 6
Indian Commissioner Smith, in his November 1, 1874, annual report to
Congress, wrote that "75,000 wild Indians" need appropriate laws governing
them as they pass out of a "savage tribal government" into control of the
United States and, in particular, laws that would eliminate the common
ownership of lands by allotting lands in severalty, which in turn would initially
20 7
be inalienable but eventually pass into fee.
In his October 30, 1876, annual report Commissioner Smith wrote that "[i]t
is doubtful whether any high degree of civilization is possible without
individual ownership of land."20 He urged that the head of each Indian family
be required to accept an allotment of land for himself and his heirs and that
these allotments remain inalienable for twenty to fifty years before passing
into fee.2"
Secretary of Interior Schurz, in his November 1, 1880, annual report, wrote
that it was a mistake to gather the Indians together on large reservations to
keep them away from white settlers.21 Instead, he wrote, it would be better to
introduce Indians to the habits of "civilized life," namely, individualized
private property ownership. This in turn would be accomplished by allotting
individual tracts of land that would remain inalienable for a period of time and
then eventually pass into fee ownership.2 1' The remaining land they could not
use or cultivate would pass to white settlers. Eventually, this would "dissolve
tribal cohesion" and "merge" Indians into the rest of the nation.'
Indian Commissioner Price wrote about "civilizing the Indians" in his
October 24, 1881, annual report to Congress and noted one cause of the

205. Id.
206. Id. at 133 (reprint of Report of the Board of Indian Commissioners (Nov. 23, 1869)).
207. Id. at 144-45 (extract of Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Nov.
1, 1874)).

208. Id at 149 (extract of Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Oct. 30,
1876)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 153 (extract of Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior (Nov. 1, 1880)).
211. Id. at 154.
212. Id.
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"unsatisfactory condition" of Indian affairs was the failure to give Indians
individual private ownership of lands.213
Commissioner Price also commented on the findings of a group gathered
to study the conditions of the Mission Indians of California in his October 10,
1883, report, which stated in part: "[F]rom poverty and ignorance and
unwillingness to abandon their custom of dwelling together in villages, under
a tribal or village government, they have failed to secure individual titles to
their lands, under the public land laws, or under the Indian homestead act.""2 4
Finally, in September 1884 the Program of the Lake Mohonk Conference
reported tribal governments were one of the most serious barriers to the
advancement of Indians toward civilization, and as such the federal
government should stop recognizing tribes as political bodies.215 To this end,
they suggested Indians should be given individual allotments of land, which
would first be made inalienable for ten to twenty-five years before vesting in
fee." 6 Thus, according to the report, the breakup of the reservation system
itself was the most appropriate action to take in "civilizing" Indians, and the
conference believed this was best accomplished by ending the common
ownership of Indian lands.2" 7
All of this culminated in passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887. Its
purpose, to be blunt, was to eliminate tribes and put Indians on individually
owned lands so they could become "civilized" and cultivate the lands much as
the white settlers. It was in effect a bill designed to parcel out reservation
lands into small farms for individual ownership by tribal members to hold in
fee and farm, leaving the remaining lands open to further settlement by the
non-Indians and in the process eliminate all remnants of tribal governments,

213. Id. at 156-57 (extract of Annual Report ofthe Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Oct. 24,
1881)).
214. Id. at 158-59 (extract of Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Oct. 10,
1883)).
215. Id.at 163 (reprint of Program of the Lake Mohonk Conference (Sept. 1884)).
216. Id.
217. Id.Prucha writes the following about the Lake Mohonk Conference:
Reformers interested in Indian affairs met each year from 1883 to 1916 at Lake
Mohonk, New York, to discuss Indian matters and to make recommendations.
These Lake Mohonk Conferences of Friend of the Indian had tremendous impact
on the formulation of federal policy. In 1884, in a series of resolutions, the
conference gave a preview of the topics that would concern it during the following
decades.
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society, and culture. The lands were placed into trust to keep them inalienable
for a certain period of time.
The stated purpose for making the land inalienable was to ensure the
Indians learned how to farm and use the lands like their white neighbors, to
keep them from state taxation, and protect them from any white man who
might try and "cheat" them out of their land.2 18 During the period in which
these lands remained inalienable, or in trust, encumbrances or conveyances
were void.2 19 In short, the lands were placed in trust to keep them from any
kind of alienation or encumbrance, particularly as against other individuals
who desired the lands. There is no reason to suppose this restraint on
alienation was intended to exclude implied servitudes through the land.
If the intent of Congress in enacting the General Allotment Act was to give
individual Indians land in fee to encourage them to farm it the same as white
settlers then there is little reason to suppose their intent with respect to rights
of ways over those lands differed from that in enacting the Homestead Act,
which opened public lands to individual fee ownership by white settlers for
farming and homesteading.
The General Allotment Act also expressly states that "[n]othing in this act
contained shall be so construed as to affect the right and power of Congress to
grant the right-of-way through any lands granted to an Indian, or a tribe of
'
Indians."22
If the intent of Congress was to allow for implied easements as
necessary for ingress and egress there would be little need for this additional
language specifically stating Congress retains the right to grant rights-of-way
over those lands.
While the purpose of the General Allotment Act was arguably to decimate
tribes by eliminating common ownership of their lands, thereby forcing
members to become assimilated into the white culture, and while Indian lands
were slashed from 138 million acres in 1887 to 48 million in 1934,221 the
policy was thankfully ended by enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934.222 At all times, however, those lands held in trust were so held to
ensure against alienation and by express statutory language void of any
encumbrances. Presumably, this includes encumbrances in the form of

218.
(1980).
219.
220.
221.
222.

18 CONG. REc. 190 (1886); see also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 544 n.5
General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887).
Id. § 10, 24 Stat. at 391.
CoHEN, supra note 17, at 138.
Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2006)).
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implied divestitures of proprietary rights in the form of easements or
otherwise.
V Conclusion
For an easement to be implied against federal lands, and Indian trust lands
in particular, the unity of title element must be capable of being found in the
sovereign. The federal courts have not clearly resolved the issue. However,
finding unity in the sovereign is implausible insofar as one would have to
presume the government intended to give every allottee of Indian land an
implied right-of-way over the adjacent trust lands, including an easement over
a junior grant thereof if necessary to reach their own land so long as the
necessity persisted, and intended to give junior grantees and their successors
in interest a way over a prior senior grant under similar circumstances. To find
that such easements exist at law would essentially amount to the creation of a
new rule of common law from whole cloth to further what a given court deems
to be appropriate as a matter of public policy. Reliance on public policy to
find such an easement at law, however, runs contrary to what most people
deem the proper role of a court. If public policy dictates such an easement
should exist, the policy makers, namely Congress or a state legislature, can
create statutes to grant easements in those cases. As mentioned above, some
states have done exactly this, though they may still not allow for easements
against the sovereign. Finally, the real question in this situation is whether
Congress intended for easements to run against government lands. To find this
intent one looks to the authorizing statutes and rules of statutory construction
in the given context, not to the status of individual grantees or the relationship
existing between the grantee and the federal government at the time of a given
conveyance of land.
The most convincing argument for finding an implied easement against the
federal government is to look to the intent of Congress when it enacted statutes
giving rise to the power to dispose of the lands. Some courts have found such
intent when it comes to school trust and riparian lands. 22 3 However, in the case
of school trust lands the law is such that statutes governing them are to be
liberally construed in their favor, precisely opposite to the rule that normally
applies when addressing federal land issues. In the case of riparian lands, it

223. With regard to riparian lands the issue is not so much whether Congress intended to
permit easements to run across the lands, but whether Congress intended to divest riparian
ownership of the common law right this type of ownership had always carried-namely the
right to riparian ingress and egress.
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has been federal common law since the inception of the United States
government that ownership of riparian lands includes ownership of rights of
access by riparian means. These circumstances are unique, as they should be.
Typically, grants from the federal government are not to be implied,
particularly in the case of Indian lands. The whole point of Indian trust lands
is to prevent the unauthorized alienation of proprietary rights. There are
statutes in place that specifically govern the granting of rights-of-way over
Indian lands. Notably, they do not provide for a way of necessity process.
The Indian Allotment Acts by their express language prohibit any conveyance
or encumbrance of any kind with respect to lands held in trust, arguably
including implied easements, or at least evincing congressional intent not to
implicitly dispose of proprietary rights over those lands. Furthermore, the
Indian Allotment Acts are much more akin to the Homestead Act, which has
been held not to have conveyed implied easements, but rather licenses over
open public lands, which themselves do not amount to vested public rights.
If Congress wanted easements in necessity situations it could have, but did not,
provided for them. Given this context, it is implausible to say Congress
actually intended for easements to be implied across Indian trust lands.
Those who fancy ways of necessity over Indian trust lands should seek their
congressional representative, not the courts.
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